The enforceability of email disclaimers in South Africa by Nyandeni, Siphamandla Thabiso
COPYRIGHT AND CITATION CONSIDERATIONS FOR THIS THESIS/ DISSERTATION 
o Attribution — You must give appropriate credit, provide a link to the license, and indicate if
changes were made. You may do so in any reasonable manner, but not in any way that
suggests the licensor endorses you or your use.
o NonCommercial — You may not use the material for commercial purposes.
o ShareAlike — If you remix, transform, or build upon the material, you must distribute your
contributions under the same license as the original.
How to cite this thesis 
Surname, Initial(s). (2012). Title of the thesis or dissertation (Doctoral Thesis / Master’s 
Dissertation). Johannesburg: University of Johannesburg. Available from: 
http://hdl.handle.net/102000/0002 (Accessed: 22 August 2017).    
1 
 
THE ENFORCEABILITY OF EMAIL DISCLAIMERS IN SOUTH AFRICA 
 
 
by 
 
SIPHAMANDLA THABISO NYANDENI 
(Student number: 215010764) 
 
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of  
 
MAGISTER LEGUM 
(LLM) 
 
In 
 
COMMERCIAL LAW  
 
In the  
FACULTY OF LAW  
 
at the 
UNIVERSITY OF JOHANNESBURG 
 
 
SUPERVISOR: Dr. M van Eck 
 
NOVEMBER 2019 
  
2 
 
Table of Content 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION .................................................................................................... 5 
1.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 5 
1.2 Purpose of the study .................................................................................................... 6 
1.3 Research question ........................................................................................................ 6 
1.4 Research methodology ................................................................................................ 6 
1.5 Proposed chapter outline ............................................................................................ 7 
CHAPTER 2: EMAIL DISCLAIMERS .......................................................................................... 8 
2.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................... 8 
2.2 Development of email disclaimers ............................................................................. 8 
2.3 Objectives of email disclaimers ................................................................................. 9 
2.4 Types of email disclaimers .......................................................................................... 9 
2.4.1 Confidentiality email disclaimers ................................................................. 9 
2.4.2 Security email disclaimers ......................................................................... 11 
2.4.3 General liability email disclaimers ............................................................. 12 
2.5 Broad categories of email disclaimers usage ....................................................... 15 
2.5.1 Once-off communications .......................................................................... 15 
2.5.2 Ongoing communications .......................................................................... 16 
2.5.3 Contracts supplemented by email disclaimers ........................................ 16 
2.6 Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 17 
CHAPTER 3: LEGISLATION ...................................................................................................... 18 
3.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 18 
3.2 Consumer Protection Act .......................................................................................... 18 
3.2.1 Background, scope And application ......................................................... 18 
3.2.2 Provisions applicable to email disclaimers............................................... 19 
3.2.3 Impact of non-compliance ......................................................................... 23 
3.3 Electronic Communications Transactions Act ...................................................... 23 
3.3.1 Background, scope and application ..................................................................... 23 
3.3.2 Provisions applicable to email disclaimers .......................................................... 23 
3.4 Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 24 
CHAPTER 4: COMMON LAW .................................................................................................... 26 
4.1 Introduction .................................................................................................................. 26 
4.2 Applicable test to determine liability in disclaimers ............................................ 26 
4.3 Public Policy and fairness ......................................................................................... 29 
3 
 
4.4 Written contracts ......................................................................................................... 31 
4.5 Foreign case law.......................................................................................................... 33 
4.6 Conclusion.................................................................................................................... 35 
CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION ...................................................................................................... 36 
BIBLIOGRAPHY .......................................................................................................................... 38 
 
4 
 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS  
I would like to take this opportunity to express my sincere gratitude to Dr Michele van 
Eck for her assistance as my research supervisor. She really motivated and 
encouraged me throughout the study and pushed me to my limit. I really appreciate 
her timeous feedbacks and constructive criticism.  
I would also like to thank my manager, Jabulile Dlamini who kept supporting me 
throughout my journey of completing my Master’s degree.  
I would also like to thank my family and friends who supported my dreams. 
Lastly, I am dedicating this work to my pillar of strength, my grandmother, Anna 
Shabalala who raised me under difficult circumstances and ensured I have a better 
future.  
 
  
5 
 
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
 
“The information contained in this communication is confidential and may be 
legally privileged. It is intended solely for the person or entity to whom or which 
it is addressed.”1 
1.1 Introduction  
Email disclaimers have become one of the basic features of modern email 
communication. They are normally placed at the bottom or beneath the content of an 
email, could be drafted in small print, or could even refer the reader to another page 
via a hyperlink. Email disclaimers are often used by corporations and private 
practicing professionals premised on the perception that email disclaimers protect 
both the sender and the content of the email. However, due to an overuse or 
perhaps the incorrect use of email disclaimers, their primary and original objectives 
have eroded over time. The use of email disclaimers are now considered to be a 
standard practice in email communication.  
Email disclaimers are closely linked to traditional liability disclaimers. Disclaimer 
notices are often used in South Africa at, for example, entrances of premises and 
public areas to limit or avoid liability.2 Over time, there has been opposing views 
regarding the validity and enforceability of these traditional liability disclaimers. On 
the one hand, South African courts have enforced traditional liability disclaimers 
which met the requirements of the applicable reasonable means test that will be 
discussed in detail in chapter 3.3 On the other hand, South African courts have also 
refused to enforce disclaimers even when they complied with the reasonable means 
test.4    
The uncertainty surrounding the enforcement of traditional liability disclaimers 
overshadows email disclaimers, and the question remains as to whether email 
disclaimers are legally enforceable in South African law. The legal position in this 
regard is unclear as there has not been a single case that could be found whilst 
                                                             
1 https://www.parliament.gov.za (02-07-2019).   
2 See Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom 2002 4 ALL SA 125 (SCA). Also more fully discussed in chap 4 (below).  
3 Durbans Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v Botha and Another (1999) 1 All SA 411 (A). 
4 See discussion in chap 4 (below). 
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researching the topic, which pertained the enforceability of email disclaimers before 
a South African court. This study attempts to answers the question as to whether 
email disclaimers are enforceable in South Africa by examining the rationale behind 
the different approaches of the courts in relation to general liability disclaimers, and 
thereby incorporating them into a discussion of email disclaimers. In addition, the 
study will also consider relevant provisions in the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 
2008 (CPA) and the Electronic Communication and Transactions Act 25 of 2002 
(ECTA) to answer the research question as they may be relevant to the regulation of 
online communications.   
1.2 Purpose of the study 
After extensive research on the topic, it was found that very little is written on the 
enforceability of email disclaimers in the South African context.5 The purpose of this 
study is, therefore, to analyse the enforceability of email disclaimers within the South 
African context and to examine the manner that email disclaimers are utilised, their 
objectives and enforceability. The study mainly focuses on the South African law and 
international references may be referred to if it furthers the discussion of the study.   
1.3 Research question 
The research question is whether email disclaimers are enforceable in South African 
law. Email disclaimers can be equated to general liability disclaimers or exemption 
clauses, which contain terms that excludes or limits the liability of one party that 
arises from a contractual relation. Generally, disclaimers are valid in South Africa 
provided they are in line with public policy and they are properly implemented. It is 
against this premise that the enforceability of email disclaimers will be considered. 
1.4 Research methodology  
The study is a literature review, by employing doctrinal methodology to critically 
analyse the relevant South African law to answer the research question. This will 
include consulting both primary sources, such as case law and legislation, and 
secondary sources of law, such as journal articles.  
                                                             
5 Lee “Have you had a look at your current email disclaimer?” 2015 (6) De Rebus 79; Rajpal “Reading the small 
print- are e-mail disclaimers really important?” 2016 (560) De Rebus 30. 
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1.5 Proposed chapter outline 
Chapter 2 will discuss email disclaimers generally as well as their development and 
characteristics. This chapter will also consider different types of email disclaimers 
and their perceived deficiencies, as well as propose a categorisation of email 
disclaimers that will form the basis for the discussion throughout the study.  
Chapter 3 will discuss the current South African legislative framework applicable to 
email disclaimers, particularly surrounding consumer protections and electronic 
contracts in the CPA and the ECTA. The discussion will also identify potential 
deficiencies in the current legislative framework and provides recommendations to 
address the deficiencies.   
Chapter 4 will discuss the applicable common law principles surrounding disclaimers 
in general by examining how the South African courts have interpreted general 
liability disclaimers in light of ticket cases and the applicable test of reasonable 
means, as well as instances where courts have applied several considerations like 
public policy and fairness to general liability disclaimers.  
Chapter 5 concludes the study by analysing of both chapters 3 and 4. It concludes 
by answering the research question as to whether email disclaimers would be 
enforceable in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER 2: EMAIL DISCLAIMERS 
2.1    Introduction 
This chapter is an overview of email disclaimers. It unpacks the concept of email 
disclaimers and starts by briefly discussing the development of these disclaimers. It 
will highlight that email disclaimers developed from faxes, and thus there will be 
inferences drawn from the latter throughout the chapter. In addition, the chapter 
highlights the reasons that email disclaimers have developed into a standardised 
practice of use in the digital era of electronic communications. Furthermore, the 
chapter discusses different types of email disclaimers and points out their potential 
shortcomings. The chapter concludes by proposing categories of the use of email 
disclaimers and provides possible outcomes in each instance.  
2.2    Development of email disclaimers 
A point of departure is that an email is the descendant of a facsimile communication, 
also known as a fax. Therefore, in order to best understand email disclaimers it is 
necessary to first look at the operation of faxes. A fax is a system used for sending 
and receiving communications using telephones lines.1 Commonly, when using fax 
transmissions, incorrectly captured telephone numbers resulted in a fax being 
delivered to the wrong recipient.2 This then raised concerns and led to the 
introduction of cover sheets, which were essentially cover pages detailing the 
negative consequences that might occur to an unintended reader of the 
communication.3 These cover sheets functioned as, amongst other things, a type of 
disclaimer.  
Fast forward to the digital era, emails use the same conceptual approach as faxes. 
The difference is that the purpose of the fax cover sheet is now achieved through the 
use of email disclaimers, which attempts to protect the content of emails by being 
read by unintended recipients. However, the only apparent difference between fax 
cover sheets and email disclaimers is that cover sheets were placed at the 
introduction of the fax just before the actual content, whereas email disclaimers are 
                                                             
1 Merriam-Webster https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/fax (10-09-2019). 
2 Krause “Guarding the cyberfort: careless internet habits can open your firm to malpractice” 2004 ARK Law 
27. 
3 Coolidge “Email disclaimers and email security” 2008 GPSolo 9 9. 
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commonly found at the end of the emails. 
2.3   Objectives of email disclaimers 
Email disclaimers appear to be commonly viewed as being vital to electronic 
communication in modern business and commercial transactions. As mentioned 
earlier, the primary objective, or at least the intent of an email disclaimer is to protect 
the sender from liability with respect to the content of the email and to protect 
sensitive information contained in the email. This is due to the concerns faced by 
many corporations and private professionals about, amongst other things, the 
confidentiality of their data and information contained in email communication. For 
example, a juristic person may send confidential information regarding their financial 
affairs and attempt to guard against the abuse of using the information by the 
recipient by embedding a disclaimer into the email, thereby attempting to protect the 
confidentiality of the information. Similarly, a private practising professional like, for 
example, an attorney, advocate or businessperson may send an email containing a 
privileged, sensitive and confidential information. Therefore, email disclaimers may 
seek to address issues like confidentiality and privilege. It is against this background 
that the use of email disclaimers have developed over the years in the digital age.  
2.4  Types of email disclaimers 
The practice of using of email disclaimers has led to the use and development of 
many different types of email disclaimers. Although there are some overlapping 
characteristics amongst the types of disclaimers, for the purposes of this discussion 
only the main types will be highlighted and discussed. The difference between the 
types of email disclaimers hinges on various factors such as the nature of the sender 
and receiver, content, information contained in the email, industry or line of business 
etc. The broad types of email disclaimers can be classified as confidentiality email 
disclaimers, security email disclaimers and general liability email disclaimers.4 
2.4.1 Confidentiality email disclaimers 
Confidentiality disclaimers are the most common email disclaimers as they attempt 
to protect the confidentiality of the information contained in an email. Put differently, 
                                                             
4 https://blog.gimm.io/email-disclaimer-examples/ (7-9-2019). 
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most email disclaimers contain a confidentiality element in light of the sensitiveness 
of the content of the email. This type of disclaimer provides that the email is only 
directed to the intended recipient and should, therefore, only be read by that 
recipient. An example of how a confidentiality email disclaimer could read is as 
follows: 
“The contents of this email are for the intended recipient only. Such content 
and any attachment/hereto, which are the property of the University of 
Johannesburg may be confidential and subject to privilege. No person, other 
than the recipient (so indicated by the sender) may use or disclose the contents 
of this message, links or attachments hereto, to any person whatsoever. 
Unauthorised disclosure and/ or use may result in civil and criminal liability”.5  
The confidentiality disclaimers are often found at the end of an email. The question 
is, therefore, why address confidentiality at the end when the recipient has already 
read and disseminated the information contained in the email? Based on this it is 
questionable whether the recipient (reader of the email) would be bound by the 
terms of the confidentiality disclaimer after having already read the content of the 
email.6 The defence is normally that even though a recipient has read the email but 
the disclaimer only requires that such information shall not be disclosed or used. It is, 
however, not necessary for the recipient to disclose the content of the email in order 
to gain an advantage or benefit by having read and disseminated the information 
contained in the email, which was not intended for the recipient. For example, the 
recipient could simply not disclose or use the information provided in an email (in a 
positive sense of the word, i.e. acting) as stated by the disclaimer ,7 but refrain from 
doing something the recipient would have done had the email not been received. 
Take for example, instances where information is disclosed in an email regarding an 
investment that may help an investor not only to actively or positively buy and sell 
but can also influence an investor’s decision not to buy or sell depending on the 
forecast. Therefore, in such an instances it would be challenging for the sender to 
prove that the recipient had used (or not used) the confidential and sensitive 
information contained in the email.  
                                                             
5 http://disclaimer.uj.ac.za (10-09-2019).  
6 See s 49(1) of the CPA as discussed extensively in chap 3 (below).  
7 Merriam-Webster https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/action (10-09-2019), defines ‘acting’ as 
taking an action. 
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2.4.2 Security email disclaimers 
Security email disclaimers are used to limit the sender’s liability in instances of inter 
alia viruses,8 Trojans9 and malware10 that may be attached to an email and which 
may damage the recipient’s computer or result in the recipient’s system to be 
infected or corrupted by such malicious software. Security email disclaimers also 
generally provide that the email may contain attachments or links to other websites 
of interest in which instances the protection of personal information provided is not 
guaranteed.11 The South African Department of Telecommunications and Postal 
Services has such an example in their electronic communication disclaimer: 
“The Department of Telecommunications and Postal Services may provide 
links to other websites as a convenience and the inclusion of any link does not 
imply the endorsement of such sites … [t]he Department of 
Telecommunications and postal Services makes no representations or 
warranties as to the accuracy of, or any other aspect relating to, those 
resources and is not responsible or liable, directly or indirectly, in any way for 
the contents, use, or inability to use or access any linked websites or resources 
or any links contained in a linked website or resource”.12 
Furthermore, other examples contain the exclusion of the liability arising from, for 
example, viruses, Trojans and malware. These malicious software programmes are 
able to multiply by spreading to other electronic systems when an infected file has 
been sent via email.13 Malicious software programmes has the potential of having a 
great negative impact to businesses and other institutions as they slow, damage or 
even destroy the functioning of their electronic systems. The sender will then insert a 
security disclaimer to alert the recipient of any possible malicious software 
programmes. An example of one such disclaimer provides the following: 
“Parliament does not guarantee that this message is secure or error-free as 
information could be intercepted, corrupted, lost, destroyed, arrive late or 
                                                             
8 http://cybercrime.org.za/virus/ (21-10-2019) describes a virus as “a self-replicating program that spreads by 
inserting copies of itself into other executable code or documents”. 
9 http://cybercrime.org.za/trojan/ (21-10-2019) describes a Trojan as “a malicious program that is disguised as 
legitimate software”. 
10 http://cybercrime.org.za/malware/ (21-10-2019) describes malware as “a programs such as viruses, worms 
and Trojans and are designed to harm a computer”. 
11 http://www.infideas.com/disclaimer-security/ (14-09-2019). 
12 https://www.cybersecurityhub.gov.za/disclaimer (14-09-2019).  
13 https://www.kaspersky.co.za/computer-viruses-and-malware (15-09-2019). 
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incomplete, or contain viruses.  Recipients are requested to scan this message 
and all attachments to ensure that it is virus free”.14 
The question then remains whether such disclaimers could allow a sender to escape 
liability from the damages suffered by the recipient? The same challenge as already 
mentioned relating to the position of confidentiality email disclaimers within an email 
communication relates to the positioning of security email disclaimers. In this 
instance, the position is quite different from the confidentiality email disclaimers 
since, in the latter, a disclaimer usually warns the unintended recipient not disclose 
or use the information received in error. However, in security email disclaimers the 
recipient would normally go through the contents of the email including following 
external links contained therein and only see the security disclaimer after the fact. It 
then seems unnecessary to warn a recipient of any possible inaccurate or corrupted 
information or data. Additionally, email disclaimers are often not read before the 
email is read and the attachments are accessed. This is largely due to the placement 
and location of the disclaimer in the email.  
Therefore, a reasonable person cannot be expected to start reading an email from 
the end, where a disclaimer is provided, and then proceed to read the body of an 
email. A more effective manner would entail placing such email disclaimers at the 
beginning or top of an email, thereby attracting the recipient’s attention to the 
disclaimer immediately.15 This approach would not be a total impenetrable shield, 
however, it would strengthen the defence of the sender as they would have taken 
reasonable steps to bring the disclaimer to the recipient’s attention.16 The 
enforceability of the limitation would have to be assessed against the test of 
reasonable means that will be discussed in detail in chapter 4.  
2.4.3 General liability email disclaimers 
General liability email disclaimers have some components of both confidentiality and 
security email disclaimers in that general liability email disclaimers provides that the 
sender will not liable for any damages or loss that may arise from the email 
                                                             
14 https://www.parliament.gov.za/email-disclaimer  (14-09-2019).   
15 See the discussion of the reasonable means test as detailed in chap 4 (below).  
16 In Durban Water Wonderland which is discussed in detail in chap 4, the court provided that liability 
disclaimers ought to be properly implemented. Also, chap 4 highlights the importance of bringing a disclaimer 
to the attention of the reader. 
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communication.  
General liability email disclaimers limit the liability of businesses by stating that the 
views contained in the email are not of the business but of that particular individual 
who had sent the email. An example of a generic general liability email disclaimer is: 
“Any views or opinions presented in this email are solely those of the 
author and not represent those of the organisation. The organisation will 
not accept any liability in respect of such communication.”17 
Unlike confidentiality and security email disclaimers which are specific in terms of the 
excluded liability, the manner in which most general liability email disclaimers are 
drafted is normally wide in order to escape any form of liability that might be 
triggered by the email, and the information contained in the email.18 However, this 
approach then raises serious concerns surrounding the employer-employee 
relationship. The confusion lies in what would constitute an opinion or view of a 
particular organisation and that of the employee in their individual capacity. 
Businesses, and particularly juristic persons carry their business affairs through 
natural persons who act on their behalf by providing the required services. This can 
be considered to be a form of agency, and in this regard an agent may be defined 
as: 
“An agent is one who performs a service for a principal, a service that 
the principal may find impracticable, inconvenient, or difficult to do for 
himself, and which he proposes to do through another. In legal terms, 
the agent’s activities are most commonly concerned with the formation, 
variation, or termination of contractual obligations. An agent has the 
ability or power to do certain acts which will alter his own or another’s 
legal position.”19 
Furthermore, section 32(4) of the Companies Act 2008 provides that the name of the 
                                                             
17 See Krause (n 2) above. See also https://www.investec.com/en_za/legal/email-disclaimer.html (16-09-
2019), which provides that “[t]he views expressed in this e-mail are, unless otherwise stated, those of the 
sender and not those of the Investec Group of Companies or its management”. 
18 It is worth noting that exemption clauses are interpreted restrictively, which may hamper the effectiveness 
of general liability email disclaimers, as referred to in Hutchison The law of contract in South Africa (2017) 281-
282.  
19 Kerr The law of agency (2006) 3.  
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company must be clearly visible in all communications of the company.20 Therefore, 
emails sent by the company through its employees ought to include the company’s 
name and registration number and this helps the recipient to identify easily the 
sender of the email. The company should not be able escape liability by providing 
that the information or contract contained in an email communication was invalid in 
that it was sent by an unauthorised director.21 In addition, section 20(2) of the 
Companies Act 2008 prohibits companies from relying on a limitation, restriction or 
qualification to assert that the action of sending an email by an unauthorised person 
is void.22 Lee argues that this provision is in line with the doctrine of ostensible 
authority.23 Ostensible or apparent authority is the authority of an agent as it appears 
to others by the conduct of the principal.24 Therefore, a person dealing with a 
company in good faith should be entitled that the company complies with all its rules 
when the email was sent.25 In Makate v Vodacom (Pty) Ltd it was stated that 
ostensible authority and actual authority are the opposites of the same coin.26 In this 
regard, “if the principal had conducted herself in a manner that misled the third party 
into believing that the agent has authority, the principal is precluded from denying 
that the agent had authority”.27 Therefore, the use of an email signature indicating 
that an individual is acting in a certain capacity on behalf of an organisation may 
result in the organisation being liable for their actions, irrespective of the content of 
the general liability email disclaimer.  
                                                             
20 S 32(4) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 states that: “[e]very company must have its name and registration 
number mentioned in legible characters in all notices and other official publications of the company, including 
such notices and publications in electronic format as contemplated in the Electronic Communications and 
Transactions Act…”. 
21 S 20(1)(a) and (b) of the Companies Act of 71 of 2008 provides that no action of the company is void only 
because it was restricted action or was done by a director with no authority.  
22 Act 71 of 2008.  
23 Lee “Have you had a look at your current email disclaimer?” 2015 (6) De Rebus 79.  
24 Hely-Hutchinson v Brayhead Ltd 1967 3 All ER 98 (CA). See also Freeman & Lockyer v Buckhurst Park 
Properties (Mangal) Ltd 1964 1 All ER 630, where the English courts have defined ostensible authority as “a 
legal relationship between the principal and the contractor created by a representation, made by the principal 
to the contractor, intended to be and in fact acted on by the contractor, that the agent has authority to enter 
on behalf of the principal into a contract of a kind within the scope of the apparent authority ...”.  
25 S 20(7) of the Act 71 of 2008. See also the common law Turquand rule as established in Royal British Bank v 
Turquand 1856 6 E&B 327, which provides that a third party transacting with a company is entitled to assume 
that all the internal affairs of the company have been complied with.  
26 2016 (6) BCLR 709 (CC). 
27 See (n 27) Makate par 45. Sharrock “Authority by representation - a new form of authority?” 2016 PELJ 15, 
argues that “[a]uthority is established if a party (the principal), by words or conduct, creates an appearance 
that another party (the agent) has the power to act on his or her behalf. 
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Moreover, the law of delict provides for the concept of vicarious liability which 
essentially means that the employer is liable for the employee’s negligent conduct.28 
In addition, there are three requirements that must be met for an employer to be 
vicariously liable for the actions of their employees, being that: (i) the employer-
employee relationship must be established, (ii) a wrongful act must be committed by 
an employee, and (iii) the employee must have been acting within the scope of their 
employment.29 There need not be fault on the part of the employer, and thus there is 
a form of strict liability.30 Therefore, provided that these requirements are met, it is 
highly likely for most general liability email disclaimers to be unenforceable and 
ineffective insofar as they may relate to the actions of individuals on behalf of a 
business or company, however, the content of any exemption clause contained in a 
disclaimer may still be subject to evaluation against public policy considerations.  
In light of the above discussion, an employee sending an email to a third party may 
be deemed to have actual or ostensible authority, depending on the circumstances. 
Therefore, an employer relying on a general liability email disclaimer may need to 
illustrate that the existence of authority on the employee had not been conferred. 
2.5   Broad categories of email disclaimers usage 
The study identifies three broad categories in which email disclaimers are used, 
being: once-off communications, ongoing communications and a contract 
supplemented by an email disclaimer. These categories shape the discussion of the 
study in the subsequent chapters.  
2.5.1 Once-off communications 
This category is limited to instances where a sender sends an email once to a 
recipient and the recipient does not respond to the email. Any one of the above 
discussed types of email disclaimers can be used in once-off email communications.  
                                                             
28 Burchell Principles of delict (1993) 215 provides that “[i]n terms of the principles of vicarious liability, an 
employer is made liable for the wrongs (delicts) committed by his or her servant in the course and scope of the 
servant’s employment. The employer need not be personally at fault in any way but the wrong of the servant 
(for which the servant remains personally liable) is imputed or transferred to the employer who often has the 
‘deeper pocket’ or ‘broader financial shoulders’ to compensate the person injured by the servant’s 
negligence.” 
29 Neethling and Potgieter Law of delict (2015) 390. See also Wicke “Vicarious liability for agents and the 
distinctions between employees, agents and independent contractors” 1998 THRHR 609.  
30 See Neethling and Potgieter (n 29) above. See also Stein v Rising Tide Productions CC 5 SA 199 (C) 5.  
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Unlike the subsequent categories (ongoing communications and electronic 
communications with email disclaimers) in once-off email communications the 
recipient generally chooses not to dispute the email disclaimer. In instances where 
the recipient respond to dispute the content of an email disclaimer no contract would 
exist between the parties. This then changes the argument of equating email 
disclaimers to general disclaimers used in law of contract.31 What is important to 
point out in once-off emails is that the recipient does not expressly agree with the 
terms of a disclaimer but, nonetheless, also does not dispute them and could then be 
considered as tacit agreement. This then is the same position as the ticket cases 
discussed in chapter 4.  
2.5.2  Ongoing communications  
Ongoing communications occur when there are more than one email between a 
sender and a recipient. Again, any one of the above discussed types of email 
disclaimers can be used in ongoing communications.  
In instances where the recipient responds to an email without disputing the terms of 
the email disclaimer, there is an agreement to the terms of an email disclaimer. The 
response is deemed as the tacit agreement to whatever terms are provided in the 
email disclaimer.32 Therefore, this category is treated the same as contracts where 
the consensus of the parties are derived from the contracting parties’ conduct. The 
subsequent chapters discussing the applicable legislation and common law will thus 
draw inference from this category.  
2.5.3  Contracts supplemented by email disclaimers  
This category concerns contracts that have been concluded electronically by means 
of emails, and in addition such email messages contain email disclaimers. Any one 
of the above discussed types of email disclaimers can be used in contracts that are 
supplemented by email communications.  
The labour court in Jafta v Ezemvelo KZN Wildlife confirmed the validity of a contract 
                                                             
31 See chap 4 (below) where there is a vast discussion of disclaimers in public avenues like parks and 
exclusionary clauses in contracts.  
32 Hutchison The law of contract in South Africa (2012) 242, defines tacit contacts as contracts inferred from 
the conduct of the parties. See also Pretorius “The basis of tacit contracts” 2010 (3) Obiter 518.  
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concluded by a data message.33 Therefore, it is not of dispute whether a valid 
contract can be concluded electronically. The challenge in this regard is the 
presence of an email disclaimer in addition to the actual contract contained as an 
attachment or in the body of the email. For example, a contract of purchase and sale 
may be concluded via email, which email communication also contains a general 
liability email disclaimer. The question, therefore, is whether the terms in the email 
disclaimer would supplement the terms of the contract found in the email, or whether 
it the email disclaimer would be a separate contract altogether? It is much simpler 
when both the terms of the contract and the general liability email disclaimer are in 
harmony with each other, but what happens when they are in conflict? Does the 
contract or the email disclaimer takes preference? If the contract takes preference 
then the purpose and enforceability of email disclaimer is brought into question. 
These questions will be addressed later in the study.34 
2.6  Conclusion 
This chapter discussed the development and the objectives of email disclaimers. It 
further examined different types of email disclaimers, namely: confidentiality, security 
and general liability email disclaimers. Moreover, there was a crucial discussion of 
broad categories of email disclaimers usage. The study identified three categories in 
which the different types of email disclaimers can be used, being: once-off 
communications, ongoing communications and contracts supplemented by email 
disclaimers. The following chapters will discuss South African law in relation to the 
types and categories of email disclaimers.
                                                             
33 2008 10 BLLR 954 (LC), in casu, the applicant had responded to an offer of acceptance for the new job 
through sending an SMS and the court held that the contract of employment of existence came into existence. 
34 See chap 5 (below) of the study.  
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CHAPTER 3: LEGISLATION 
 
3.1 Introduction 
The South African leading provisions surrounding email communications are found in 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA).1 The Consumer 
Protection Act (CPA) is also relevant insofar as it may apply to consumer protection 
in consumer contracts.2 Both Acts offers some protection to senders and receivers of 
email communications.  
This chapter will, therefore, examine the provisions of the ECTA and the CPA closely 
to determine aspects that may be applicable to email disclaimers. This discussion 
seeks answers to the research question by establishing the enforceability of email 
disclaimers within the scope of these Acts. The CPA offers more protection to 
consumers who are regarded as weaker contracting parties in commercial 
transactions, and thus contains provisions regulating online transactions in this 
regard. The ECTA on the other side regulates all electronic communication. The 
discussion will commence with an overview of CPA, progress to ECTA and conclude 
on discussing whether perhaps there is a need to regulate email disclaimers 
specifically.  
3.2 Consumer Protection Act 
3.2.1 Background, scope and application 
The CPA came into force on 11 April 2011 and was enacted for the purposes of 
protecting consumers by promoting a “consistent legislative and enforcement 
framework relating to consumer transactions and agreements”.3 More specifically the 
preamble acknowledges the dynamic technological state and trading methods and 
provides that, in light of these reasons, it desirable to strengthen consumer rights 
and responsibilities. The discussion of the provisions of the CPA is, however, limited 
to those provisions that may be relevant to email communications between the 
suppliers and consumers in light of commercial transactions and agreements. It is 
worth noting that there is no provisions in the CPA that make specific reference to 
                                                             
1 Act 25 of 2002.  
2 Act 68 of 2008. 
3 The preamble of the CPA.  
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email disclaimers, however, certain provisions are indirectly relevant to the study, 
and hence there will be inferences made to them.  
Of particular importance is section 1 of the CPA which defines a “consumer” as a 
person who has entered into a transaction with a supplier in the ordinary course of 
supplier’s business.4 A service provider means “a person who promotes, supplies or 
offers to supply any service” The relevant category then in this regard, is contracts 
supplemented by email disclaimers and will only apply insofar as the contract (that 
the email disclaimer supplements) falls within the scope of the CPA.5 Therefore, the 
scope of the discussion below will be limited to email disclaimers between 
consumers and service providers. 
3.2.2 Provisions applicable to email disclaimers  
Certain provisions of the CPA may be relevant, insofar as general liability email 
disclaimers are used provided that the transaction falls within the scope of the CPA.6 
Section 48 of the CPA provides that a contract may not contain unfair, unreasonable 
or unjust contract terms. Section 48(1)(c) states that a supplier must not require a 
consumer or other person to whom any goods or services are supplied at the 
direction of the consumer- 
     “(i)  to waive any rights; 
     (ii)  assume any obligation; or 
     (iii)  waive any liability of the supplier, 
on terms that are unfair, unreasonable or unjust, or impose any such terms as a 
condition of entering into a transaction.”7 
Therefore, online transactions containing email disclaimers that fall within the scope 
of the CPA ought to contain fair and reasonable terms. In this regard, section 48(2) 
of the CPA further provides that a term in a transaction is considered to be unfair, 
unreasonable or unjust if:  
                                                             
4 S 1 of the CPA. 
5 S 5 of the CPA. 
6 S 5 of the CPA. 
7 S 48 (1)(c) of the CPA.  
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“(a)   it is excessively one-sided in favour of any person other than the consumer or 
other person to whom goods or services are to be supplied; 
(b)   the terms of the transaction or agreement are so adverse to the consumer as to 
be inequitable; 
 (c)   the consumer relied upon a false, misleading or deceptive representation, as 
contemplated in section 41 or a statement of opinion provided by or on behalf of the 
supplier, to the detriment of the consumer; or 
(d)   the transaction or agreement was subject to a term or condition, or a notice to a 
consumer contemplated in section 49 (1), and- 
(i)  the term, condition or notice is unfair, unreasonable, unjust or unconscionable; or 
(ii)   the fact, nature and effect of that term, condition or notice was not drawn to the 
attention of the consumer in a manner that satisfied the applicable requirements of 
section 49”.8 
Naudé provides that in addition to the above mentioned terms, Regulation 44 of the CPA 
creates 28 clauses that are presumed to be unfair.9 In this regard, Naudé creates a red list 
which contains a list of unfair terms that must not be used for example, terms limiting the 
supplier's vicarious liability for its agents.10 This prohibition is relevant to general liability 
disclaimers as discussed in chapter 2 since they limit the employer’s liability in emails sent 
by its employees.   
Naudé and Eiselen point out that in defining unfairness as per section 48, the purposes of 
the CPA must be taken into consideration.11 In this regard, section 3 of the CPA provides 
that the purposes of the CPA is to promote social and welfare of consumers in South Africa 
by inter alia establishing a legal framework that will achieve a fair accessible consumer 
market,12 improving vulnerable groups’ consumer experience,13 promoting fair business 
practices,14 protecting consumers from unfair trade practices,15 and promoting consumer 
                                                             
8 S 48(2) of the CPA.  
9 Naudé “Towards augmenting the list of prohibited contract terms in the South African Consumer Protection 
Act 68 of 2008” 2017 TSAR 138 
10 Naudé (n 9) 144. 
11 Naudé & Eiselen Commentary on the Consumer Protection Act (2017) 48-1. 
12 S 3(1)(a) of the CPA. 
13 S 3(1)(b) of the CPA. 
14 S 3(1)(c) of the CPA.  
15 S 3(1)(d) of the CPA.  
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confidence.16 Naudé and Eiselen further argue that promoting fair contractual terms is in line 
with Constitutional right to dignity, which also promotes the principle of good faith.17 More 
importantly, the legislative control over unfair contract terms in relation to email disclaimers 
is crucial since the terms of email disclaimers are non-negotiated terms.18 The challenge 
surrounding non-negotiated terms is the potential unfair provisions that they may contain 
which is exacerbated by the unequal bargaining position and relationship between supplier 
and consumer.19 
Furthermore, section 49(1) of the CPA requires notices or consumer agreements 
that limit the risk or liability of suppliers or constitutes an assumption of risk or liability 
by the consumer to be drawn to the attention of the consumer as per the 
requirements of subsections (3) to (5).20 Therefore, email disclaimers (once-off 
communications and ongoing communications) as notices and consumer 
agreements (online contracts supplemented by email disclaimers) ought to be 
inserted in a manner that draws attention to the reader and drafted in plain 
language.21 De Stadler and van Zyl argue that in applying the principles of plain 
language, it must be determined whether the ordinary consumer for whom the 
document is intended, is able to understand it and use it.22 In addition, Naudé & 
Eiselen submit that in the absence of a format that constitutes a conspicuous 
                                                             
16 S 3(1)(f) of the CPA.  
17 Naudé & Eiselen (n 9) 48-8.  
18 Naudé & Eiselen (n 9) 48-8. 
19 Naudé & Eiselen (n 9) 48-10. 
20  S 49 (3)-(5) provides the following: 
“(3) A provision, condition or notice contemplated in subsection (1) or (2) must be written in plain language, as 
described in section 22. 
(4) The fact, nature and effect of the provision or notice contemplated in subsection (1) must be drawn to the 
attention of the consumer- 
   (a)   in a conspicuous manner and form that is likely to attract the attention of an ordinarily alert consumer, 
having regard to the circumstances; and 
   (b)   before the earlier of the time at which the consumer- 
     (i)  enters into the transaction or agreement, begins to engage in the activity, or enters or gains access to 
the facility; or 
    (ii)   is required or expected to offer consideration for the transaction or agreement. 
(5) The consumer must be given an adequate opportunity in the circumstances to receive and comprehend the 
provision or notice as contemplated in subsection (1).” 
21 S 5 of the CPA.  S22 of the CPA provides that a document is in plain language “if it is reasonable to conclude 
that an ordinary consumer of the class of persons for whom the notice, document or visual representation is 
intended, with average literacy skills and minimal experience as a consumer of the relevant goods or services, 
could be expected to understand the content, significance and import of the notice, document or visual 
representation without undue effort.” and Van Zyl “Plain-language contracts: challenges and opportunities” 
2017 SA Merc LJ 95.  
22 De Stadler and van Zyl “Plain-language contracts: challenges and opportunities” 2017 SA Merc LJ 124.  
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manner that is likely to attract the attention of an ordinarily alert consumer as per 
section 49 (4)(a) of the CPA, the clauses referred to in section 49 of the CPA should 
not be “printed on the reverse side of a contractual document containing the main 
terms on its front, even if that is done in a contrasting colour or font”.23 This 
argument is also relevant to email disclaimers since the terms of the email 
disclaimers are found below the main content of emails. Therefore, it may be 
sufficient to insert the email disclaimers close to the main content of emails in a 
manner that will attract the recipient of an email who reads the main content of an 
email.24   
Moreover, following the discussion in chapter 2 on the broad categories of email 
disclaimers, it was concluded that in once-off communications where the recipient 
chooses not to dispute a disclaimer and in ongoing communications, consensus is 
reached and an agreement may be formed if the requirements of the reasonable 
means test are met. Section 49 (4)(b)(i) of the CPA provides that the nature of the 
notice must be drawn to the attention of the consumer before the earlier of the time 
at which the consumer enters into the transaction or agreement or begins to engage 
in the activity. In this regard, email disclaimers must, therefore, alert consumers at 
the earliest time, i.e. before the reader engages with the content of the email.  
In addition, the CPA prohibits the inclusion of certain terms in agreements if they are 
contrary to it. Section 51(b) of the CPA provides that a supplier must not make an 
agreement subject to any term or condition if it directly or indirectly purports 
to: “(i) waive or deprive a consumer of a right in terms of this Act; (ii) avoid a 
supplier's obligation or duty in terms of this Act; (iii) set aside or override the effect of 
any provision of the CPA”.25 More importantly in relation to email disclaimers, 
suppliers ought not to require consumers to enter into supplementary agreements 
which contain the abovementioned prohibited terms.26 In this regard, email 
disclaimers could be considered as an additional agreement since the terms of the 
contract are expressed in the actual content of emails.  
                                                             
23 Naudé & Eiselen (n 9) 49-3. 
24 Naudé & Eiselen (n 9) 49-3.  
25 S 51(b).  
26 S 51(2)(1). 
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3.2.3 Impact of non-compliance 
Contracts that are supplemented by email disclaimers which fall within the scope of 
the CPA will, therefore, need to comply with the above-mentioned provisions of the 
CPA. In this regard, section 52 of the CPA sets out the powers of the court to ensure 
fair and just conduct, terms and conditions. Section 52(4) of the CPA provides that if 
a term in a contract failed to satisfy the requirements of section 49, the courts may 
make an order that the term is void. Therefore, contracts supplemented by email 
disclaimers containing an unfair term, will be declared void. Furthermore, a person 
may approach a court, the Tribunal or the Commission if alleging that a consumer’s 
right in terms of the CPA has been infringed.27 
The above discussion is limited to email communications between the suppliers and 
consumers in light of commercial transactions and agreements. Below is a wider 
discussion of general electronic communications.  
3.3 Electronic Communications Transactions Act 
3.3.1 Background, scope and application 
The ECTA came into force on 30 August 2002 with the aim of regulating the 
electronic communications and transactions. The ambit of the ECTA extends to both 
commercial and non-commercial communications and transactions. The ECTA is 
welcomed as both recognising electronic transactions and offering protection to 
consumers in electronic transactions.28 
3.3.2 Provisions applicable to email disclaimers 
Section 11 of the ECTA is of utmost importance since it legally recognises data 
messages. Section 11 of the ECTA stipulates that:  
“(1) Information is not without legal force and effect merely on the grounds that it is wholly or partly     
in the form of a data message. 
(2) Information is not without legal force and effect merely on the grounds that it is not contained in 
                                                             
27 S 4(1) of the CPA. 
28 Jacobs “The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act: consumer protection and internet contracts” 
2004 SA Merc LJ 556 566. See also Coetzee “The Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25: 
Facilitating Electronic Commerce” 2004 STELL LR  510, emphasizes that consumer protection is offered to 
“consumers” who are natural persons which then creates a shortfall in regards where companies are involved.  
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the data message purporting to give rise to such legal force and effect, but is merely referred to in 
such data message. 
(3) Information incorporated into an agreement and that is not in the public domain is regarded as 
having been incorporated into a data message if such information is- 
(a)   referred to in a way in which a reasonable person would have noticed the reference thereto 
and       incorporation thereof; and 
(b)   accessible in a form in which it may be read, stored and retrieved by the other party, whether 
electronically or as a computer printout as long as such information is reasonably capable of being 
reduced to electronic form by the party incorporating it.” 
The above section has established that data messages carry weight in our law and 
cannot be denied in their admissibility in courts due to their nature. Therefore, emails 
containing email disclaimers cannot be held inadmissible only because of their 
electronic nature. However, this legal recognition is not to be interpreted in isolation 
as it must take into account other statutory provisions and common law applicable to 
electronic transactions.29  
Another important issue relates to a majority of email disclaimers arising from 
automated transactions or emails. The debate is about the specificity of these 
disclaimers or whether they are casting the net as wide as possible. In this regard 
section 20(e) of the ECTA provides that in an automated transaction “no agreement 
is formed where a natural person interacts directly with the electronic agent of 
another person and has made a material error during the creation of a data 
message”.30 It further states that an electronic agent needs to provide an opportunity 
to a natural person to rectify an error made when the data message was created.31 
Therefore, email disclaimers generated automatically cannot bind a recipient where 
they have made a material error and no opportunity was given for a rectification.  
3.4 Conclusion 
In conclusion, CPA regulates email disclaimers in relation to emails between 
                                                             
29 S 3 of ECTA. 
30 S 20 of the ECTA.  
31 S 20(e)(i) of the ECTA. See also Snail “An overview of South African e-consumer law in the context of the 
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (part 2)”Juta’s Business Law 2007 57, “where an e-vendor’s 
e-mail contains a unilateral term that non-response to it will result in the acceptance of its terms, it cannot 
hold the e-consumer contractually liable.   
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suppliers and consumers and to the extent of the application of the CPA.32 According 
to the CPA, email disclaimers need to be drawn to the reader’s attention in plain 
language. In addition, the ECTA governs a wider scope of email disclaimers than the 
CPA as it does not limit the application to communications between suppliers and 
consumers. Therefore, the ECTA is also applicable between the communications 
and transactions of private parties.  The provisions highlighted in this chapter would 
be applicable in the validity and enforceability of terms contained in an email 
disclaimer.
                                                             
32 S 5 of the CPA provides for the scope of the application of the Act.  
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CHAPTER 4: COMMON LAW 
 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explores exemption clauses as used generally in notices, disclaimers, 
tickets and written contracts, as they are foundational to establishing the 
enforceability of email disclaimers in South Africa. The discussion connects to the 
problem statement in that exemption clauses found in notices are similar to 
exemption clauses found in email disclaimers since both attempt to escape liability 
under certain circumstances. Often the consent in these instances are tacit in nature, 
and results in a tacit agreement provided the requirements of the reasonable means 
test are met.1 In this instance, it can be presumed that the individual agrees or 
consents to the disclaimers by responding to the email. This chapter also discusses 
a few foreign law cases which specifically deals with email disclaimers. The study 
will then point out how can the South African law draw inference from these 
judgments.  
4.2 Applicable test to determine liability in disclaimers  
A good starting point in discussing disclaimers and exemption clauses is looking at 
Central SAR v McLaren2 where Innes CJ referred to Parker v South Eastern Railway 
Co that provided: 
“Where a person delivers a parcel at the cloak room of a railway company, 
and receives a ticket with conditions on the back limiting the company’s 
liability, he is not bound if he does not know there is there is writing on the 
ticket, but if he knows there is writing containing conditions he is bound, if 
he knows there is writing, but does not know it contains conditions, he is 
bound, if in the opinion of the jury reasonable notice is given that it contains 
conditions.”3 
                                                             
1 The study in chapter 4.2 (below) discusses in detail the test employed by the courts in determining liability in 
disclaimers. 
2 1903 TS 727. 
3 1877 36 LT 540. 
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Innes CJ then applied the following test: 
(1) Did the plaintiff know that there was writing or printing on the ticket? 
(2) Did she know that the writing on the ticket contained conditions relating to the 
terms of the contract of carriage?  
(3) Did the defendants do what was reasonably sufficient to give the plaintiff 
notice of the conditions?  
There has been much debate about the above test. The concerns relate to whether 
the test is dependent on the first question, i.e. whether question 3 falls away if 
question 1 is answered in the negative.4 The controversy revolves around whether 
the customer would be bound by the terms even though the supplier took all 
reasonable steps to bring the notice (or disclaimer) to the customer’s attention, and 
this could place the supplier is placed in a precarious position.5  
In King’s Car Hire v Wakeling the court developed the law in this regard and 
provided that the test is not dependent on the first question and, therefore, where the 
supplier did all that is reasonable to draw the customer’s attention to the terms of the 
contract, the latter will be bound.6 This then boils down to the fact that it is a difficult 
task in most instances to prove whether the customer read the document but the test 
is not whether the customer read the document, but rather ought to be whether the 
supplier performed what was reasonably sufficient or possible for the customer to 
see the document.7  
To determine whether the supplier took reasonable steps will be decided on a case 
by case basis. One such case is Bok Clothing Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd v Lady Land 
Ltd where the court provided that: 
                                                             
4 Christie The law of contract in South Africa (2016) 25.  
5 Christie (n 4).  
6 1970 4 SA 640 (N) 643E.  
7 See Christie (n 4). 
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“..[t]he nature of the document is relevant to the steps required of a party in 
order to bring the contractual provisions to the other party’s attention. The 
more contractually obscure or incidental the document, the less likely it is to 
expect it to contain contractual provisions and the more specific and 
positive must the steps be which are taken to bring this to the attention of 
the other party...”8 
Another case relevant to this discussion is Durban's Water Wonderland (Pty) Ltd v 
Botha.9 In casu the first respondent and her daughter were seriously injured when 
they were flung from a ride at the appellants’ amusement park. The respondent then 
claimed for damages and the appellant’s defence was the disclaimer exempting it 
from any liabilities relating to injuries arising from its park. The disclaimer in question 
provided the following: 
“The amenities which we provide at our amusement park have been 
designed and constructed to the best of our ability for your enjoyment and 
safety. Nevertheless we regret that the management, its servants and 
agents, must stipulate that they are absolutely unable to accept liability or 
responsibility for injury or damage of any nature whatsoever whether 
arising from negligence or any other cause howsoever which is suffered by 
any person who enters the premises and/or uses the amenities provided”10 
The Supreme Court of Appeal found it crucial to first consider the accurate approach 
to be placed on the disclaimer. In this regard it stated that if the language used 
exempts the proferens from liability in clear and express terms, then effect must be 
given to that meaning.11 The court concluded that the language used in the 
disclaimer was unambiguous and meant that the appellant was not liable for any 
claims of damages arising from the utility of its amenities. Regarding the question 
raised in the court of first instance, on whether the terms of the disclaimer were 
incorporated into the agreement entered by the respondent when purchasing the 
rides’ tickets, it held that the answer is in the affirmative if the proferen did what was 
“reasonably sufficient” in order for the patrons to see the disclaimer. The appellant 
placed these disclaimers at the cashiers' windows using a white font where the 
                                                             
8 1982 2 SA 565 (C) 569E-G. See also Davidson v Johannesburg Turf Club 1904 TH 260.  
9 1999 1 SA 182 (SCA).  
10 Durban’s Water Wonderland (n 9) par E.  
11 Durban’s Water Wonderland (n 9) par F. See also Van der Westhuizen v Arnold 2002 4 ALL SA 331.  
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notice would be seen by a person purchasing the tickets. The court was satisfied that 
the steps taken by the appellant were reasonable and therefore held that the 
respondent’s contract was subject to those terms.  
In Jacobs v Imperial Group the appellant left his car at the premises of the 
respondent for repairs.12 There was a disclaimer at these premises which read: 
“Vehicles are left at owner’s risk”. The appellant’s vehicle was later stolen whilst 
located on the respondent’s premises. The court in answering the question of 
whether the owner’s risk can be successfully relied upon in this regard, the approach 
as discussed above already enquires whether the respondent acted sufficiently 
reasonably in bringing the notice to the attention of its customers in general and in 
particular, to Jacobs’ attention. The court further stated that the disclaimer was 
prominently displayed in clear terms on the notice boards at the respondent’s 
entrance at the cashier’s window. The court concluded that the respondent did more 
than what was sufficiently reasonable as it displayed the disclaimer at focal locations 
to inform its customers of the disclaimer’s applicability. 
In light of the above discussion, email disclaimers need to comply with the above 
discussed test since they limit the liability of the sender. In this regard, the sender 
must ensure that they bring the terms of email disclaimers to the attention of the 
recipient. Therefore, a court in determining enforceability of a particular email 
disclaimer will also look at the means employed by a sender in this regard as to 
whether they were sufficiently reasonable. The court will be more likely to enforce an 
email disclaimer if the reasonable means test is met. However, more factors will 
come into play in such determination by the courts. An example of these factors are 
public policy and fairness as discussed below.  
4.3 Public Policy and fairness 
It is trite in law that contracts must be legal. In this regard public policy is taken into 
consideration. In Morrison v Angelo Deep Gold Mins Ltd the court stated: 
“Now it is a general principle that a man contracting with duress, without fraud, 
and understanding what he does, may freely waive any of his rights. There are 
                                                             
12 2009 ZASCA 167.  
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exceptions to that rule, and certainly the law will not recognise any 
arrangement which is contrary to public policy.”13 
Similarly in Afrox Healthcare Bpk v Strydom, the Supreme Court of Appeal stated 
that unfair provision in a contract that is not in line with the public interest is legally 
unenforceable.14 In casu, the heart of the dispute concerned the exclusion of liability 
agreement entered into by the respondent and the appellant (the owner of the 
hospital). In terms of this agreement, the appellant was absolved from any claims of 
damages by the patients or their dependants arising from injury or damage caused 
to the patient. The court held that abstract ideas such as good faith and fairness do 
not constitute a separate basis for setting aside the terms of the contract as agreed 
upon by the parties.15 It further held that the fact the respondent entered into a 
contract without reading does not make the contract unenforceable and he was, 
therefore, held to be bound by the terms.16 
Johannesburg Country Club v Stott dealt with the question of the validity of 
exemption clauses excluding causation of death.17 The case was initiated by the 
respondent, Mrs S, the widow of the deceased against the appellant, the 
Johannesburg County Club alleging that the latter’s negligence caused the death of 
her husband. The appellant raised the exemption clause signed both by Mr and Mrs 
S as a defence. In terms of this clause, “the Club shall not be held liable for personal 
injury or harm however caused to members or their children or their guests on the 
Club premises and/or grounds”.18 In interpreting the exemption clause the court 
looked at First National Bank of SA Ltd v Rosenblum where Marais J provided that 
where an exclusionary clause is articulated in a language excluding liability for 
negligence, it will not be interpreted in this manner so as to give preference to a 
meaningful application.19 The court in Johannesburg Country Club then concluded 
                                                             
13 1905 TS 775 779. See also Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC), where Ngcobo J stated that public policy 
represents the legal convictions of the community and it is deeply rooted in the Constitution and the values 
underlying it such as human dignity and equality.  
14 2002 6 SA 21 (SCA) 8. See also Hughes v SA Fumigation Co (Pty) Ltd par 23, where the court stated that a 
supplier of goods cannot rely on an exemption clause that excludes liability for defects in the goods. The court 
then held such provision to be contrary to public policy. 
15 Afrox Healthcare Bpk (n 12) par 32.  
16 Afrox Healthcare Bpk (n 12) par 36.  
17 2004 (5) SA 511 (SCA). 
18  Johannesburg Country Club (n 17) par 4.  
19 2001 4 SA 189 (SCA) 6.  
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that allowing the exclusion of liability for damages for negligently causing deaths 
would be against public policy.20 Therefore, email disclaimers containing such 
exclusions could be invalid and thus be unenforceable.  
In Barkhuizen v Napier, the Constitutional Court specifically dealt with the question of 
fairness. It stated that when determining fairness, two questions need to be asked: 
firstly, whether the clause in question is unreasonable and secondly, if the clause is 
reasonable, whether it should be enforced in the light of the circumstances which 
prevented compliance with the time-limitation clause.  The court elaborated further 
and provided that the first question involves the weighing-up of two considerations; 
public policy and the fact that the all persons have a right to seek judicial redress. 
The second question then involves an inquiry into the circumstances that prevented 
compliance with the clause.  
In a more recent case than the abovementioned cases, in Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 
the court stated that a guest in a hotel does not take his life in his hands when he 
exits through the hotel gates. The court further stated that “to deny him judicial 
redress for injuries he suffered in doing so, which came about as a result of the 
negligent conduct of the hotel, offends against notions of justice and fairness”.21 
Heaton-Nicholls J made an obiter dictum and provided that an exemption clause 
excluding liability for negligently causing bodily injuries or death will not pass the 
constitutional test.22 
4.4 Written contracts  
A signature in a contract symbolises consent of a contracting party in relation to the 
terms contained therein. It serves as evidence that a party was aware of the terms 
regardless of whether the terms were read or understood.23 Koornhof argues that 
this legal position is in harmony with the caveat subscriptor rule.24 This rule is crucial 
                                                             
20 First National Bank of SA Ltd (n 17) par 12. 
21 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ) 53. See also Mupangavanhu “Exemption clauses and the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 
2008: An assessment of Naidoo v Birchwood Hotel 2012 6 SA 170 (GSJ)” 2014 PER 3 17. 
22 Naidoo (n 19) par 54.  
23 Koornhof “The enforceability of incorporated terms in electronic agreements” 2012 (2) Juris 52.  
24 Koornhof (n 23) 53. Nortje “Unexpected terms’ and caveat subscriptor” 2011 SALJ 741, notes that the rule 
means that “a party who has signed a contractual document will be bound to all terms contained in that 
document, whether or not she has read them or was subjectively willing to consent to them”.  
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since it helps establishing legal certainty in contracts. 25 In George v Fairmead (Pty) 
Ltd26 which is a locus classicus of the caveat subscriptor rule, the appellant initially 
entered into a verbal contract with the defendant (hotel), and later entered into a 
written contact which exempted the hotel from liability for loss of a guest’s property. 
Such a clause was not mentioned in the verbal contract. The appellant then sued the 
defendant after his belongings were stolen from the room in which he was staying. 
The court stated that the appellant was bound to the contract by the virtue of the 
caveat subscriptor rule irrespective of whether he was not aware that a new term will 
be included in the written contract.27 
In Mercurius Motors v Lopez, the case dealt with the theft of a car left by a client at a 
motor dealer for repairs.28 When the car was stolen, the dealer relied on the 
exemption clauses signed by Lopez when he left the car at their premises. The court 
stated that: 
“A person delivering a motor vehicle to be serviced or repaired would 
ordinarily rightly expect that the depository would take reasonable care in 
relation to the safekeeping of the vehicle entrusted to him or her. An 
exemption clause such as that contained in clause 5 of the conditions of 
contract, that undermines the very essence of the contract of deposit, 
should be clearly and pertinently brought to the attention of a customer who 
signs a standard instruction form, and not by way of an inconspicuous and 
barely legible clause that refers to the conditions on the reverse side of the 
page in question…”.29 
The court, therefore, did not look at the disclaimer in isolation but also considered 
the duties of the respondent as a motor dealer, the duties of safeguarding the keys 
of the vehicle. Therefore, in application of this approach by the court it can be 
deduced that in relation to email disclaimers the courts will also look at whether the 
sender fulfilled all their duties when sending an email. The duties in this regard will 
depend on the email and the disclaimers used therein. For example, a sender of an 
email accompanied by a security disclaimer must also take necessary steps to 
                                                             
25 Koornhof (n 23).  
26 1958 (2) SA 465 (A).  
27 George (n 24) par 469B-C.  
28 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA).  
29 Mercurius (n 26) par 33.  
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ensure that the email is “virus free”. Furthermore, Hawthorne,30 argues that 
Mercurius provide a link between the common law exemption clauses and the 
Consumer Protection Act (CPA).31 In this regard, and as mentioned in a previous 
chapter, section 49(1) of the CPA provides that terms limiting the supplier’s liability 
must be drawn to the customer’s attention.32 This approach then creates imposition 
of mandatory information obligations and thus promotes a fair and reasonable 
relationship between consumers and suppliers.33 
The discussion of the above South African cases was specifically for disclaimers in 
general since there has not been a case brought by the South African courts. The 
inference that can be drawn from the above discussion in relation to email 
disclaimers is the test of determining liability in disclaimers. Therefore, the courts are 
more likely to put an emphasis on the reasonable means employed by the sender in 
bringing the reader’s attention to an email disclaimer. The discussion below relates 
to foreign case law for limited jurisdictions that have decided on cases concerning 
email disclaimers.  
4.5 Foreign case law  
It has been established that the South African courts have not dealt with a case 
specifically concerning email disclaimers and hence the above section made 
reference to disclaimers as used in ticket cases. It is against this background that the 
study discusses foreign law since there have been a number of cases dealing with 
the issues of email disclaimers. Although these cases are not authoritive in South 
African law, they may be influential when a case is decided in South Africa regarding 
email disclaimers.  
In Romero v Romero, an unpublished Californian case,34 the plaintiff applied for a 
domestic violence protective order against her husband who allegedly sent her 
threatening emails. One such email contained vulgar language and ended with a 
disclaimer which read:  
                                                             
30 Hawthorne “Mercurius Motors v Lopez 2008 (3) SA 572 (SCA)” 2009 42 De Jure 352. 
31 Act 68 of 2008. 
32 S 49(1) of the CPA.  
33 See Hawthorne (n 30) 359.  
34 2011 D054548 Super. Ct. No. DV028614. 
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“Not one word herein should be construed by anyone as meaning violent or 
threatening intentions, and instead the entire contents is to be taken by the 
strict literary meaning. There have not been, and will be any elucidated 
threats of violence or intent, either expressed or implied, within the entirety 
of this document”35 
The defendant contended that as consequence of the disclaimer the content of the 
email should not be the basis of the protective order. The court dismissed this 
defence and provided that one cannot send threating emails which contain vulgar 
language and use an email disclaimer as a shield.  
In Langley v Witschel,36 the defendant applied for a dismissal of the plaintiff’s claim 
on the basis that it had prescribed. The plaintiff did not deny prescription but 
provided that the defendant confirmed the cause of action by sending emails before 
the limitation period expired. However, the defendant contended that the emails 
contained disclaimers and, therefore, must not be interpreted as admissions of 
liability. One such email in question ended with a disclaimer which read “nothing 
herein contained is or shall be construed as either an admission of liability or a 
waiver of or an extension of any applicable limitation period”. On 8 March 2013, the 
plaintiff wrote an email to the defendant enquiring about the payment of an invoice. 
On 18 March 2013 the defendant responded to this email and provided that he is 
unable to advise about payment since he was still waiting for investigations to be 
completed. The court had to consider two legal issues in relation to the emails: (a) 
whether they contain an acknowledgement of the cause of the action; and (b) 
whether the email as a whole can be taken to be an admission of liability in 
consideration of the disclaimer in the email. On the argument provided by the 
applicant that the disclaimer was atomically generated and thus meaningless, the 
court provided that this cannot be deduced merely by the location of the disclaimer. It 
further stated that if a disclaimer directly contradicts the contents of an email then a 
reasonable person may favour the language of the contents of an email over the one 
for disclaimers.37 The court concluded that the emails did not amount to admissions 
                                                             
35 Romero (n 30). 
36 2015 BCSC 123. 
37 Langley (n 21) par 61.  
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of liability nor cause of action and that there was no evidence showing that the 
language in a disclaimer was meaningless.  
4.6 Conclusion 
In conclusion, it is apparent from the above discussion of the South African case law 
of ticket cases that the courts are more concerned about the reasonable means in 
relation to disclaimers. In light of email disclaimers, the same test must be 
applicable. If it is proven that the sender did all that what was reasonably possible to 
bring the reader’s attention to the terms of the disclaimer, then such an email 
disclaimer could also be enforceable. This is also in consideration of the underlying 
values of the Constitution like fairness and public policy.38 The foreign case law 
proved that an email disclaimers must be in line with the content of an email. 
Therefore, email disclaimers are not interpreted in isolation and cannot be used to 
escape liability if their language contradicts the substance of an email.   
                                                             
38 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  
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CHAPTER 5: CONCLUSION 
 
The study examined the South African law to determine whether email disclaimers 
are enforceable in South Africa. This was assessed against the different types 
(confidentiality, security and general liability email disclaimers) and categories (once-
off communications, ongoing communications and contracts supplemented by email 
disclaimers) of email disclaimers, which were discussed in chapter 2. 
In chapter 3, the applicable legislative provisions to email disclaimers were 
discussed. The legislation pointed out that although email disclaimers are not 
specifically provided for in the Consumer Protection Act (CPA) and Electronic 
Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA), legislation does make mention of 
company’s notices and electronic communications respectively. Email disclaimers 
can, therefore, be equated to these notices and communications since they can be 
incorporated into notices and communications. In terms of the CPA, the email 
disclaimers containing unfair terms as provided for under section 48 of the CPA 
would be contrary to the Act. In addition, since email disclaimers limit the suppliers’ 
liability, they need to be drawn to the consumers’ attention in plain language and at 
the earliest of the transaction. Therefore, for email disclaimers to be enforceable they 
would likely need to be placed at the beginning of emails, or be mentioned therein 
that they are present at the end of the email. In terms of ECTA, no agreement will be 
formed if a natural person made a material error when responding to an automated 
email. Therefore, there is scope from the current legislative framework that email 
disclaimers may be recognised provided they are compliant with the provisions of the 
ECTA and CPA (insofar as these Acts are applicable). 
The study in chapter 4 equated email disclaimers to general liability disclaimers. In 
this regard, the reasonable means test was discussed in length through common law 
and concluded that email disclaimers also need to comply with this test in order to be 
enforceable. In terms of this test, an email recipient must be aware of the presence 
of an email disclaimer, terms provided therein and the sender needs to do what is 
reasonably sufficient to draw attention of the reader to the terms of email 
disclaimers. Therefore, it was argued that placing the email disclaimers at the end of 
the email in small prints is not reasonably sufficient to give notice to the reader of the 
terms of email disclaimers. A more suitable approach will be placing email 
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disclaimers at the top of emails or alternatively making a statement in bold indicating 
that there are email disclaimers at the bottom of an email.  
In light of the above chapters, the study achieved its purpose by extensively 
discussing the manner that email disclaimers are utilised in chapter 2 and examining 
their enforceability in chapters 3 and 4. Therefore, the enforceability of the email 
disclaimers will be tested against the applicable law relating to that specific email 
disclaimer in question. In this regard, email disclaimers falling within the scope of the 
CPA needs to be in line with the CPA in order to be enforceable. In conclusion, email 
disclaimers are valid in South African law but their enforceability will be subject to 
meeting the requirements of the law as discussed throughout the study. Therefore, 
the enforceability of email disclaimer would be determined in a case by case basis.   
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